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Securities Regulation: Section 13(d) From Blot to GAF

The Williams Act' was passed by Congress in 1968 in order to
regulate corporate take-over attempts, principally those in the form of
tender offers. 2 Since the enactment of this amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 3 however, section 13(d)4 of the Act, which drew
little attention as a companion to the much publicized section 14(d),' has

proved vexatious in application and has resulted in clear conflicts in
interpretation between several federal district courts and at least two

courts of appeals.' This note will examine the statute as interpreted by
the two principal cases decided under it and discuss the weight which
should be given those decisions in future applications of the law.

Section 13(d) 7 of the Act provides that upon acquisition of more
'Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities Exchange Act
§§12-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-n (1970).
'For an analysis of the corporate take-over attempt by tender offer and the projected effect
of the Williams Act see Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitation, 21 RUTGERS L. REV.
609 (1967). For a more recent appraisal see Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REv. 377
(1969). Congress determined that there was a need for the protection of shareholders and prospective investors when there were rapid accumulations of the securities of corporations. It responded
with the Williams Act. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 85457 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams);/ Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1934 Act: New
Directions for Federal Corporation Law, 15 N.Y.L.F. 674, 707 (1969); Note, Securities-The
Williams Act: A "Tender Trap," 24 Sw. L.J. 542 (1970).
315 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
I1d. § 78m(d).
5
The corporate tender offer is directly regulated by § 14(d). Id. § 78n(d).
'These conflicts will be discussed infra in the context of the cases in which they arose.
7
Securities Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) (1970) provides in relevant part:
(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title,
or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been required to be
so registered except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G) of this title, or
any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the
issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, send
to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement
containing such of the following information, and such additional information, as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate,
or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an
issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the purposes of this
subsection.
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than five percent8 of a class of the securities of a corporation the person
or group acquiring such securities must file a Schedule 13D with the
Securities Exchange commission. This statement discloses the number
of shares the person owns or controls; the sources of funds for any
purchases; any prospective additional purchases intended; the background and identity of all persons on whose behalf the purchases were
effected; any arrangements with others concerning loans, options, and
proxies; whether control of the issuer is sought; and any major plans
such person has for the issuer if control is obtained.9
In the first case to consider whether the requirement for filing had
been "triggered,"'" Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot," the plaintiff corporation sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Blot and his associates
from voting stock they had allegedly acquired without making the disclosure required by section 13(d). The defendants, who owned more than
ten percent of Bath's outstanding shares of common stock, "undertook
(5) The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order, may permit any person
to file in lieu of the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsection or the rules
and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of such person, the number of
shares of any equity securities subject to paragraph (1) which are owned by him, the
date of their acquisition and such other information as the Commission may specify, if
it appears to the Commission that such securities were acquired by such person in the
ordinary course of his business and were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have
the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer nor in connection with or
as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect.
(6)

The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-

(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same
class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that
class;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of
this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect
of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection ...
'Pub. L. No. 91-567, § I, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), amending Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(l),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I) (1970), reduced the level of equity ownership triggering the disclosure
requirement from 10% to 5%. At all relevant times for the cases discussed in this Note the level
was 10%. This change does not affect the principles involved.
'Securities Exchange Act§ 13(d)(l)(A)-(E), 15 U.S.C.§ 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1970). For specific
disclosure requirements see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1971) (provisions for filing a Schedule 13D).
"Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulfur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970), considered the
sufficiency of a § 13(d) filing, but the question of whether a filing was required was not at issue.
"427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), affg 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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a deliberate, conscious plan to pool their voting interests in Bath stock
and to acquire additional shares of Bath stock, and to obtain the support
and votes of other large stockholders

. .

to the end that they could

force the resignation of [the president of Bath] ....,,,2
Pursuant to this
"plan," several of the defendants increased their holdings substantially
and began preparing for a proxy contest.
In granting Bath's request for an injunction, the district court found
that the defendants did constitute a "group" as defined by section
13(d)(3) and therefore were required to file a 13D disclosure.13 The
court of appeals, in affirming, rejected Bath's contention that the Blot
group would have to comply with the Act within ten days of the time
they agreed to act in concert whether or not any members of the group
had purchased additionalstock in furtherance of their plan." The court
found, rather, that "the Act should be interpreted to require compliance
with its disclosure provisions when, but only when, any group of stockholders owning more than 10% of the outstanding shares of the corporation agree to act in concert to acquire additionalshares." The court
further stated that the Act "does [not] proscribe legitimate cooperation
among existing shareholders to assert their determination to take over
control of management, absent an intention to acquire additional shares
for the furtherance of such purpose."'"
The Bath court's interpretation of section 13(d) went unchallenged
until recently, when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in GA F
Corp. v. Milstein7 rejected the Bath holding insofar as it would require
that the disclosure mechanism be .set in motion only by additional
acquisitions of stock after a section 13(d)(3) group was formed. In GAF
the GAF Corporation alleged that the Milstein family, which had acquired collectively more than ten percent of the preferred shares of
GAF, 8 "formed a conspiracy among themselves and other persons to
act as a syndicate or group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
1305 F. Supp. at 531.
"Id. at 537.
"1427 F.2d at 108-09.
"Id. at 109 (emphasis by the court).
'Id. at 110.
17453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"'The Milsteins, a father and his three children, obtained 10.25% of the outstanding preferred

shares of GAF Corporation when the Rubberoid Company, in which they held 8% of the common
stock, was merged with GAF. Since the merger, the Milsteins had acquired no additional preferred
shares of GAF. They had purchased 1.6% of GAF common stock. 324 F. Supp. at 1064.
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disposing of securities of GAF with the ultimate aim of seizing control
of GAF for their own personal and private purposes."' 19
The lower court determined that the issue was whether organizing
a ten percent group with a view to seeking control of the corporation
was, without more, a reportable event under 13(d). 0 That court rejected
GAF's contention that when a group is formed there is a constructive
conveyance of the stock from the individual members to the group and
thus an "acquisition" by the group. Instead, in granting the Milsteins'
motion for dismissal, the court said that "the specific statutory language
is clear and compels the construction that the reportable event is the
acquisition

. . .

21

and not the mere formation of a group with a view to

control."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
in part and found that the Milsteins were a "group" and thus a "person"
as defined by section 13(d)(3). The controlling question was whether the
group had acquired the stock owned by its members.22 The court answered that question affirmatively, saying that "[m]anifestly, according
to the complaint, the group when formed acquired a beneficial interest
in the individual holdings of its members. 123 Thus the Milsteins, employing that "legitimate cooperation among existing shareholders" to
which the Bath court had referred with approval,24 were found to have
subjected themselves to the disclosure requirement of section 13(d).
There is clearly a conflict as to when the formation of a group
triggers the filing requirement. The Seventh Circuit would require not
only that the group be formed for the stated purposes, but also that the
group then agree to acquire additional shares. In GAF, the Second
Circuit found that the formation of the group in itself constituted the
qualifying acquisition. In light of these decisions a court must answer
several question in interpreting section 13(d). It must decide when a
"group" is formed, and after its formation, when it becomes a "person."
The statute provides that "[w]hen . . .persons act as a . . .group for
the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities . . . such

• ..group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this subsec"1453 F.2d at 713.
20324 F. Supp. at 1064.

21ld. at 1067.
22453 F.2d at 715.
2Id. at 716.
21427 F.2d at 110.
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tion." As the court in GAF points out, an interpretation requiring that
the group agree to acquire additional shares ignores the words "holding" and "disposing. "26 The Bath court had been persuaded by the
in the legislative history of the Act to "purchase" and
repeated reference
"acquisition '2 7 that the Act was intended to protect investors only when
the group made acquisitions after its formation. Such an inference
might be valid were it not for the considerable evidence that the Act was
intended to provide disclosure when stock is rapidly accumulated, however that accumulation is accomplished. The Committee Reports on the
Williams Act stated that:
[Section 13(d)(3)] would prevent a group of persons who seek to pool
their voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from evading
the provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more than
10 percent of the securities. The group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of more than 10
percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed to act in concert.
Consequently, the group would be required to file the information
called for in section 13(d)(1) within ten days after they agree to act
together, whether or not the group had acquired any securities at that
time. This provision is designed to obtain full disclosure of the identity
of any person or group obtaining the benefits of ownership of securities
understanding, relationship, agreement or
by reason of any contract,
8
other arrangement.2
This statement goes directly to the point of the Bath and GAF
cases, and legislative history should be given considerable weight where,
as in the case of section 13(d), conflicting interpretations are possible."
The court in Bath acknowledged the difficulty of proving a group's
agreement to acquire securities and concluded that when a group agrees
to act in concert and some members of that group subsequently acquire
additional securities, there is a rebuttable presumption that the acquisition was made pursuant to an agreement.3 " At the time of the subsequent acquisition the group would be subject to the disclosure requirements of section 13(d). This "presumption" would frustrate the purpose
2Securities Exchange Act § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1970).
2'453 F.2d at 718 n.18.
e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 24664-65 (1967).
2'H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968).
"Nolan v. United States, 41 F.2d 962, 965 (Ct. C1. 1930); see Commissioner v. Bilder, 369
U.S. 499, 502 (1962).
10427 F.2d at 110.
2See,
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of the statute since disclosure would, in effect, be required only after the
group had actually acquired additional securities, with the result that
information would not be available to the shareholder until well after
the need for it had arisen. In light of the purposes of the Act, the more
reasonable interpretation would seem to be that of the Second Circuit:
that persons acting in concert are a group; that a group formed for the
purposes stated in the Act is to be treated as a person; and that such a
"person" who owns more than five per cent of a class of the securities
of an issuer must meet the disclosure requirement.
When a five per cent group is formed for one of the purposes set
out in the statute,3' it is subject to the requirements of section 13(d)(1).
In addition, however, the courts must determine whether, under that
section, an acquisition triggers the filing requirement. Sections 13(d)(5)
and 13(d)(6)(D) 32 provide for lesser filing requirements or in some cases
for exemptions from filing. Under these two sections the Commission
may modify the disclosure requirement if neither the purpose nor the
effect of the acquisition was to change or influence the control of the
issuer. Congress by these provisions clearly contemplated acquisitions
33
with respect to which no protective disclosure would be necessary
The courts are in conflict, however, as to the relevance of the purpose
of an acquisition when there has been no ruling by the Commission
under 13(d)(5) or 13(d)(6)(D). Neither Bath nor GAF directly considered this question, although the GAF court did indicate that not all
formations, even though acquisitions of the required percentage of
34
stock, would trigger the filing requirement.
The problem is clearly delineated by two district court cases in
which groups were not involved. Those cases, Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v.
Cox 31 and Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc." both involved the
inheritance of securities. In Ozark the court held that inheritance was
not a reportable acquisition, saying that the "subsection . . . clearly is
3115 U.S.C. 78re(d)(3) (1970).
32

1d. § 78m(d)(5), (6)(D), set out note 7 supra.
=The statute indicates that Congress expected the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate objective standards for the exemptions provided. Id. Research has disclosed no such
promulgation as of the date of this writing.
3'Rejecting the Milsteins' argument that the GAF decision would "catch too many fish," the
court said.that "[mianagement groups per se, are not customarily formed for the purpose[s]" of
the statute. Therefore, the court avoided the question of whether management groups which pool
their interests to fight a takeover are subject to section 13(d). 453 F.2d at 719.
1326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31[1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
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designed to regulate filings regarding purposeful acquisitions, holdings
or disposals" which change or influence the control of the issuer or
affect the market.37 The court in Sisak, on the other hand, held that
the beneficiary and the executor of an estate which included thirty-one
percent of the shares of a corporation were required to file. The court
explained that section 13(d) "is not tied to proxy contests

. .

. [and] is

not limited to any particular mode of 'acquisition.' "38
Both the history and the -language of the Act seem to support the
reasoning in Sisak. It seems clear that Congress saw the need for investor protection in situations in which neither tender offers nor proxy
fights were contemplated at the time of acquisition.3 9 A contrary interpretation would require the courts to speculate about motive rather than
focus on the ability to influence the control of the issuer."
Finally, the requirements of section 14(d)41 should be compared
with those of section 13(d). Section 14(d)(1) makes it unlawful for a
person to make a tender offer for any class of the securities of an issuer
if after the offer is consummated such person would own more than five
percent of that class, unless at the time the offer is made a disclosure-Schedule 13D-is filed with the Commission by the person making the offer. Section 14(d) is much narrower in scope than section 13(d)
since the latter will require disclosure in many cases in which no tender
offer is made. Section 14(d), however, would seem to require disclosure
in situations in which section 13(d) does not operate only if a person who
owns less than five percent makes a tender offer for more than that
37326 F. Supp. at 1117.
31[1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. T 92,991, at 90,668.

aThe Exchange Act provides for disclosure in proxy fight and tender offer situations. Securities Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). The practical difficulty of proving intent when
the initial acquisitions are made, however, requires an objective standard for triggering § 13(d).

These considerations were also factors in the decision to lower the percentage of shares which
triggers 13(d) to 5%. See Hearings on Problems in the Securities Industry Before the Subcomum.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969)
(remarks of Mr. Budge).
"'Congress sought to protect investors by requiring disclosure when a "person" has the ability
to influence control of a corporation. Recent Developments, An Informal ShareholderGroup Must
Meet Williams Act Disclosure Requirements within Ten Days after the Group Has Decided to
Acquire Additional Shares in Furtheranceof a Plan to Seek CorporateControl, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 466, 469-70 (1971); Note, 24 Sw. L.J., supra note 2, at 550; Comment, Section 13(d) And
Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853, 856 (1971). See also 6 L.
Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3664 (Supp. 1969); 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967).
"Securities Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1970). For a general discussion
of § 14 see Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969).
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amount and fails to acquire at least five percent. Viewed together, the
sections point to the conclusion that while Congress specifically provided for disclosure in tender offer situations, they also saw the need for
of securities prior to or in the
disclosure with respect to aggregations
42
complete absence of a tender offer.
The conflicting interpretations of section 13(d) thus remain unresolved. The recent amendments to that section,43 which provide for
more stringent disclosure requirements, are a strong indication that
Congress saw the need for disclosure in every case in which the control
of a corporation might be affected. At the same time, foreseeing that
disclosure may in some cases be unnecessary or unduly burdensome,
Congress has given the Commission broad discretion to temper the
effect.of the statute.
Section 13(d) should be interpreted to require disclosure, in the
absence of intervention by the Commission, whenever a five percent
"group" is formed for the purposes set out in the statute and when a
person acquires five percent of a class of shares, whatever the purpose
or mode of that acquisition. If this interpretation is followed the influence of section 13(d) in the field of securities regulation will probably
be much greater than that of section 14(d), and 13(d) should, in the
future, be recognized as the real "meat" of the Williams Act.
DENNIS P. MYERS

"i1t has been argued that incumbent management's benefit from this '"early tipoff" (proxy and

tender offer regulations need not be in effect when § 13(d) is triggered) is much greater than that
contemplated when Congress voiced its intention not to tip the scales in favor of either party. See,
e.g., Note, 71 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 40.
3
Pub. L. No. 91-567, § I, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), amending Securities Exchange Act § 13(d),

15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
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